Foundational literature

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Presence and the Self: a cognitive neuroscience approach

This paper proposes a neurobiology-based theory of presence based on four different positions related to the role and structure of presence, as follows. First, presence is a defining feature of self and it is related to the evolution of a key feature of any central nervous system: the embedding of sensory-referred properties into an internal functional space. Without the emergence of the sense of presence it is impossible for the nervous system to identify the separation between an external world and the internal one. Second, even if the experience of the sense of presence is an unitary feeling, conceptually it can be divided in three different layers, phylogenetically different and strictly related to the three levels of self identified by Damasio (Damasio, 1999). In particular we can make conceptual distinctions between proto presence, core presence, and extended presence. Third, given that each layer of presence solves a particular facet of the internal/external world separation, it is characterized by specific properties. Finally, in humans the sense of presence is a direct function of these three layers: the more they are able to differentiate the self from the external world, and the more they are integrated, the more we experience a sense of presence.

This paper proposes a neurobiology-based theory of presence based on four different positions related to the role and structure of presence, as follows. First, presence is a defining feature of self and it is related to the evolution of a key feature of any central nervous system: the embedding of sensory-referred properties into an internal functional space. Without the emergence of the sense of presence it is impossible for the nervous system to identify the separation between an external world and the internal one. Second, even if the experience of the sense of presence is an unitary feeling, conceptually it can be divided in three different layers, phylogenetically different and strictly related to the three levels of self identified by Damasio (Damasio, 1999). In particular we can make conceptual distinctions between proto presence, core presence, and extended presence. Third, given that each layer of presence solves a particular facet of the internal/external world separation, it is characterized by specific properties. Finally, in humans the sense of presence is a direct function of these three layers: the more they are able to differentiate the self from the external world, and the more they are integrated, the more we experience a sense of presence.

Riva, G and Waterworth, J A (2003).Presence and the Self: a cognitive neuroscience approach. Presence-Connect, 3 (3), posted 07-04-2003.

1 The Biological Purpose of Presence
1.1 The emergence of extended consciousness

For organisms in a natural environment, it is vital to pay attention and respond rapidly to present threats and opportunities. Our emotional and cognitive life is built on this evolutionary substrate. But as our self evolved, imagined situations became increasingly important to survival and biological success. In his Brainstorms (Dennett, 1978) book, Dennett suggested the existence of an important difference between self and point of view:

“Point of view clearly had something to do with personal location, but it was itself an unclear notion. It was obvious that the content of one's point of view was not the same as or determined by the content of one's beliefs or thoughts. For example, what should we say about the point of view of the Cinerama viewer who shrieks and twists in his seat as the roller-coaster footage overcomes his psychic distancing? Has he forgotten that he is safely seated in the theater? Here I was inclined to say that the person is experiencing an illusory shift in point of view. In other cases, my inclination to call such shifts illusory was less strong. The workers in the laboratories and plants who handle dangerous materials by operating feedback-controlled mechanical arms and hands undergo a shift in point of view that is crisper and more pronounced than anything Cinerama can provoke.” (p. 314-315, Italics added)

As noted by IJsselsteijn and Riva (IJsselsteijn & Riva, 2003), what Dennett calls “an illusory shift in point of view” conceptualizes well the concept of presence. The question is, how our mind can say that this shift in the point of view is illusory? How is it possible to differentiate between a real and an imagined situation?

According to recent psychological theory, perceptions are guesses of what is out there now and predictions of what is about to happen. A way to put this is that perceptions are rather like hypotheses of science - predictions of unsensed features of objects, and of futures that may not happen (Gregory, 1998b). They are never certainly true and often wrong. Yet the guesses of hypotheses are the nearest we ever get to reality. If perceptions are internal predictions, how can we differentiate them from other internal processes, such as conceptual modeling?

According to current neurobiological work, evolution created two different levels of consciousness to solve this problem (Damasio, 1999): core consciousness and extended consciousness. Core consciousness is what we share with some nonhuman animals - a simple biological phenomenon, the scope of which is the Here and Now. This basic, integrated representation of one moment and one place is independent of language, reasoning and memory (Metzinger, 1999).

When we imagine, think, plan and generally deal with information that does not only constitute our experience of things and events in the currently present external situation we are exercising extended consciousness: “Extended consciousness has to do with making the organism aware of the largest possible compass of knowledge.” (p. 198). According to Damasio, extended consciousness emerges from:

· The gradual build-up of memories of the organism’s biography (the experiences of the “core-self”). Each autobiographical memory then becomes an object, which takes part in inducing and enhancing core consciousness;

· The ability to hold active, simultaneously and for an extended period of time, many images that collectively define the autobiographical self and the object it is interacting with.

It is extended consciousness that allows us to create an internal world in which we may suspend disbelief, as compared to a perceptual world experienced as outside the self. Extended consciousness relies on working memory (Damasio, 1999), which can be seen as the “active scratchpad” of mental life (Baars, 1988). It is in working memory that the internal world we are currently experiencing is largely created. Its main function is to allow us to consider possibilities not present in the current external situation. In contrast, core consciousness is directed exclusively to the here and now – the present – and is what we share with all conscious animals.

Extended consciousness gives us obvious advantages over organisms without it, such as the ability to plan and generally enact in the imagination possible scenarios in the future, as well as to increase the sophistication of learning from the past. Language depends on it, because we must retain linear sequences of symbols in working memory if we are to understand utterances, whether spoken or written.

The advantages of extended consciousness depend on the fact that we can distinguish between the experience of the external word and experience of internal worlds, both remembered and imagined. Confusions of the two indicate serious psychological problems, problems which, until recent times, would have prevented survival and the passing on of this condition. As noted by Waterworth and Waterworth (Waterworth & Waterworth, 2003): “if we react as if the external world is only imaginary we will not survive long (think of this the next time you cross a busy street). And if we think that what we are merely imagining is actually happening, we may omit to carry out basic activities on which our survival depends. We are suggesting that presence is the feeling that evolution has given us to make this vital distinction.” (p. 2)
1.2 The presence of self

According to this view, what is the role of self? Damasio proposes important conceptual distinctions between a preconscious precedent of self and two distinct notions of self-consciousness (Damasio, 1999; Dolan, 1999):

  • the proto self: a coherent collection of neural patterns that map, moment by moment, the physical state of the organism;
  • the core self: a transient entity which is continuously generated through encounters with objects;
  • the autobiographical self: a systematic record of the more invariant properties that the organism has discovered about itself.

In this vision, the basis for a conscious self is a feeling state that arises when organisms represent a non-conscious proto-self in the process of being modified by objects. In essence, the sense of self depends on the creation of a second-order mapping, in certain brain regions (brainstem nuclei, hypothalamus, medial forebrain and insular and somatosensory cortices), of how the proto-self has been altered (Dolan, 1999).

However, it is only the autobiographical self that generates the subjective experience of possessing a transtemporal identity. The presence of the autobiographical self centers the flow of our interactions with perceptual objects on itself, thereby making them our own experiences. In summary, the presence of you is the feeling of what happens when your being is modified by the acts of apprehending something (Metzinger, 1999).
1.3 The brain mapping

As we have just seen, core self and core consciousness have their origins in a mapping of body states and are about two facts: the organism relating to sensory streams and the fact that this relation causes a change in the organism. It follows that a key starting point for a theory of presence is description of how the brain maps its sensorial inputs, and, most importantly, the dynamics of their relationship.

Damasio tries to answer this question by adding two more components to his model:

· Autobiographical Memory: the organized record of the main aspects of our biographies;

· Dispositions: records, which are dormant in our memory until activated by a similar or related experience.

To understand how these components are related we can use an example: the way our self experiences the first view of the Colosseum in Rome. We receive sensory signals from our eyes, ears, nose and sense of touch that are mapped by the proto self. Some microseconds later, this activity is monitored by the core self and becomes the content of core consciousness. A few microseconds more are required for the activation of extended consciousness. Some milliseconds later, it adds dispositional records of that place (or similar places) coming from autobiographical memory. We may recognize the place because we studied it in architectural history; and we may have emotional ties because we associate the place with special memories (our most recent experience of the Colosseum was while watching a preferred movie: “Gladiator”). The result is a single conscious experience integrating perceptions, emotions and feeling. Once the event has ended, it is restored in dispositional space with new data about our most recent experience.


2 The Three Layers of Presence

One of the main ideas expressed in this paper is the link between presence and self. More in detail, we suppose that presence is the result of the evolution of the central nervous system in its attempt to embed the sensory-referred properties into an internal functional space (Llinás, 2001). As noted by Waterworth and Waterworth (Waterworth & Waterworth, 2003), the appearance of the sense of presence allows the nervous system to solve a key problem for its survival: how to differentiate between internal and external states.

We hypothesize that it is possible to associate a specific layer of presence with each of the three levels of self identified by Damasio. Further, given that each layer of presence solves a peculiar facet of the internal/external world separation, it is characterized by specific properties.
2.1 The first layer: proto presence

As we have seen, the main activity of the proto self is a non-conscious mapping of the physical state of the organism. What is the evolutionary goal of the proto self? To predict the characteristics of the external world as it is experienced through sensorial inputs.

As suggested by Llinás this can be done even by a lamprey (Llinás, 2001). How? The steps identify by the latest neurobiological studies are (pp. 23-24):

· the comparison of the sensory referred properties of the external world with a separate internal sensorimotor representation of those properties;

· the transformation/utilization of this premotor solution into finely timed and executed movements.

In this process movement plays a key role. On one side, an adaptive movement is the evolutionary goal of the proto self. On the other side, it is through motility that it can embed the propriety of the external world in its sensorimotor representation. These properties are the constraints generated by the coordinate systems that describe the body: in an evolutionary process that required millions of years the proto self experienced, through movement, these constraints and used them to model the external world. In this vision how can we define proto presence? Tentatively we can say that the more the proto self is in the body, the more it is different from the external world. More precisely we can define proto presence as an embodied presence related to the level of perception-action coupling: the more the organism is able to couple correctly perceptions and movements, the more it differentiates itself from the external world, thus increasing its probability of surviving.
2.2 The second layer: core presence

In Damasio's model, the second level of self is the core self, a transient entity, ceaselessly re-created for each and every object with which the brain interacts. What is the evolutionary goal of the core self? It is the integration of specific sensory occurrences into single percepts.

According to Gregory (Gregory, 1998b) this is done through a coherent world-model that evolves in real time according to its own internal logic. In such a vision, perception depends very largely on knowledge derived from past experience of the individual and from evolutionary experience.

During waking consciousness, this model is modulated by the senses, but it persists even when sensory input is temporarily cut off: close your eyes and you'll still be keenly aware that the Colosseum is in front of you. As far as your inner model is concerned, the Colosseum is still there; and as that inner model is used to generate motor commands, any movements you choose to make (such as searching for a taxi) will be adjusted to take the Colosseum’s presence into account. As suggested by Farber, the core self has two functional states (Farber, 2001): while 'online' — actively synchronized with the external world — it can be used to predict what will happen next or what the likely outcomes of different actions will be, and while 'offline', it can model scenarios from memory or imagination, or generate the realistic (if disordered) worlds of our dreams. However, this model works if the nervous system is able to differentiate between the two states. In fact, recognizing the present is essential for survival in the here and now.

Gregory underlined (Gregory, 1998a): “As perception depends on rich knowledge from the past stored in the brain, there must be a problem in identifying the present moment from past memories, and also from anticipations running into the future. The present is signaled by real time stimuli from the senses; but as perceptions are 90% or more stored knowledge, the present moment needs to be identified for behavior to be appropriate to what is happening out there now.” (p. 1694, italics added)

How is this done? Neurobiological research suggests the existence of two specific processes: cognitive binding and temporal coherence: In Llinás' approach (Llinás, 2001) cognitive binding is done by the core self through the temporal linking of the independently operating neural mechanism included in the proto self. By inducing temporal coherence to different neural structures, the core self is able to produce a shift in attentional focus. This shift is also able to differentiate between dreaming and waking: in dreaming the intrinsic activity of the proto self does not correlate sensory inputs with ongoing thalamocortical activity (thalamocortical system is considered the site of the core self) making them invisible to the core self (Llinás & Pare, 1991).

In these processes what is the role of core presence? Core presence is the activity of selective attention made by the self on perceptions: the more the organism is able to focus on its sensorial experience by leaving in the background the remaining neural processes, the more it is able to identify the present moment and its current tasks, increasing its probability of surviving.
2.3 The third layer: extended presence

The higher level of self in Damasio's theory is the autobiographical self. Autobiographical self is based both on memory and on anticipations of the future, and integrates memories of past experiences, learned ideas, beliefs and skills, and hopes for the future into present experience. As detailed by Damasio (Damasio, 1999), “autobiographical self depends on systematized memories of situations in which core consciousness was involved in the knowing of the most invariant characteristics of an organism's life - who you were born to, where, when, your likes and dislikes, the way you usually react to a problem or a conflict, your name, and so on.” (p. 86)

This involves the use of the centers of higher thought in the cortex and the widely distributed faculty of memory. In fact, it develops gradually throughout life and is largely the product of adding abilities, reasoning and memories of all the richness of experience to core consciousness.

The possibility of defining internal goals and tracking their achievement is the element that allows the final shift in the evolution of the self: from meaning-as-comprehensibility to meaning-as-significance. Meaning-as-comprehensibility refers to the extent to which the event fits with our view of the world (for example, as just, controllable, and nonrandom) whereas meaning-as-significance refers to the value or worth of the event for us (Janoff-Bulman & Frantz, 1997). In this vision, the role of extended presence is to verify the significance of the experience for the self. The more the self is present in significant experiences, the more it will be able to reach its goals, increasing its possibility of surviving.
3 Focused Presence: integrating the three layers
3.1 Focus, locus and sensus

Waterworth and Waterworth (Waterworth & Waterworth, 2001) outlined a three-dimensional model of experience in relation to presence, consisting of focus, locus and sensus. Principally, the model was intended to provide a possible design space, in which potential and actual interactive media applications could be placed, as an aid to both design and evaluation. Focus described the nature of an observer’s attention, specifically whether attention is mostly directed towards present events (in the real or a virtual world) – in which case the models predicts a high degree of presence – or is mostly directed towards internally-generated information which is not currently present in the world. The former can be characterised as perceptual (or concrete) processing, the latter as conceptual (or more abstract) processing. Waterworth and Waterworth (Waterworth & Waterworth, 2001) referred to this latter, reflective state of mind as absence, corresponding to a low degree of presence, and suggested that position on the focus dimension determines the degree of experienced presence.

We can now extend and refine this concept of focus in light of the three levels of presence proposed earlier in the paper. Specifically, we suggest that focus can be seen as the degree to which the three layers of presence are integrated towards a particular situation. The more integrated the layers, the higher the degree of experienced presence. Presence would be maximized when the contents of extended consciousness are closely aligned to those of core consciousness and of proto consciousness, when the three levels are working in concert to produce a strong focus on the present environment. The pivot for this integration is core presence. Absence of mind thus arises when extended consciousness is minimally concerned with the current situation, or situations, with which core consciousness is involved.

From a biological, survival perspective, the real world has priority and is the background against which mental life is framed. The proto self exists moment by moment through our monitoring of our internal and external environment. To maintain our bodies in the world we need to know both their internal state and their precise relations to the world immediately around them. Much of this is unconscious and automatic, we only become specifically aware of processes such as digestion or proprioception when things do not function normally, within limits acceptable for the stability of the organism. This awareness arises as the events are integrated into core consciousness, as described earlier.

One of the main reasons for current interest in presence is that it may be evoked by both the real world and by media. The locus dimension (Waterworth & Waterworth, 2001) captures the extent to which the observer is attending to the real world or to a world conveyed through media. The biological purpose of presence means that it is dominated by the current state of the body, and perceptions of the current state and position of the body in relation to the world in which the body is located. Any mediated presence is in competition with presence in the real world. "Breaks in presence" (Slater & Steed, 2000) are an example of rapid shifts of presence between the real and a mediated world. In other words, they seem to be temporary changes in the locus of experience, although Spagnolli and Gamberini (2002) present evidence that they are more a temporarily wider distribution of presence over the locus dimension – taking in both the real and the virtual worlds.

The history of media and their effects is complex and beyond the scope of this paper. We will simplify for present purposes by suggesting that some traditional non-electronic media, such as books, verbal accounts, and letters, address extended consciousness. This limited capability was mirrored later by electronic media such as text documents, e-mails and telephone calls. All of these produce a conceptual model in the reader or hearer that is usually not closely or immediately related to his or her current situation in the real world. In other words, they do not elicit core or proto presence. Because of this, they produce a relatively low degree of presence integration and are low on the focus dimension. Traditional pictorial media forms such as drama, painting and sculpture were often successful in evoking a sense of core presence and sometimes also a sense of extended presence with which it was integrated to a greater or lesser degree. Again, this is mirrored by more recent electronic media such as television, computer graphics, and animations. Still, not all levels of presence are addressed by such media and, because of this inherently restricted focus, the degree of experienced presence is correspondingly limited.

The third dimension of Waterworth and Waterworth’s (Waterworth & Waterworth, 2001) model, sensus, refers to the level of consciousness or attentional arousal of the observer, and we can also interpret its effects on presence in terms of our three layers of presence. Arousal will affect such factors as degree of activity of the organism, and the effect is likely to be passed upwards, to the core self, which may then become more actively engaged in the world. Conversely, arousal of the core layer will tend to impact downwards on the proto self, which will become innervated to cope efficiently with the current situation. At the level of extended consciousness, attentional arousal will tend to be determined by the significance of what is experienced, the meaning of current events.
3.2 Presence in media: limitations and potentials of designed presence

In this section, we apply our three-layer theory of presence to try to understand the different ways in which aspects of mediated experience impact on presence. From that, we outline the potential of this view as a tool for designing particular types of experience with predictable degrees and types of presence.

Because we are always in the real world, even when engrossed in media or in thought, proto presence is probably never totally divorced from the current physical situation and state in which we find ourselves. Most mediated experiences do not attempt to address the individual at the level of proto consciousness, since the technical demands of eliciting presence are less the higher the layer invoked. As already stated, absence of mind arises when extended consciousness is minimally concerned with the current situation, or situations, with which the other two layers are involved. A well-written novel can readily engage extended consciousness, while core consciousness will be little affected, and proto consciousness not at all. Overall, presence is not focused, and the degree of reported presence will be relatively low. Some researchers suggest that a novel may provide the technological minimum for presence in media (e.g. Slater, 2003). Since we view presence as a solution to the problem of determining what is happening to the self at the present time, we suggest that extended presence does not exist without core consciousness. Core consciousness drives the problem solution; the more it is able to integrate the three layers, the more convincing the answer to the problem.

Moving down from extended to core consciousness, the technological demands on the medium increase. Whereas the machinery of conceptual modeling is abstract and relatively slow, perceptual models and the predictions they provide must be created fast, since this core level is evolutionarily designed to support what may be very rapid interactions with the real world. To mimic this natural interactivity involves rapid response times between a medium and its user, and often involves detailed inspectability of aspects of any displayed information. More generally, information must be displayed in concrete forms that can be accepted by core consciousness as realistic. Proto presence has the most demanding technological requirements, and is the last of the three layers to be addressed through media. It functions at the level of proprioception, spatial and internal monitoring, which may reflect the primal role of these processes in the evolution of consciousness (e.g. Sheets-Johnstone, 1998). As yet, our ability to simulate the demands of this layer is far from complete.

Proto presence is based on proprioception and other ways of knowing bodily orientation in the world. In a virtual world this is sometimes known as "spatial presence" and requires the tracking of body parts and appropriate updating of displays. Core presence is based largely on vividness of perceptible displays. This is equivalent to "sensory presence" (e.g. in non-immersive VR) and requires good quality, preferably stereographic, graphics and other displays. As already stated, core consciousness is the pivot for judgements that something from the world outside is impacting on the self, on the life of the organism. As with the extended presence layer, if proto consciousness is integrated with core consciousness, proto presence will be involved and this layer will strengthen the overall sense of presence. The extent to which these two levels are integrated produces what is usually called degree of immersion. Extended presence requires intellectually and/or emotionally significant content. Integrating the three layers amounts to fooling the system into a conviction that something is happening to the self in the here and now.

The different layers of presence may be less than perfectly integrated in several ways, including the following:

· If you experience a VR without a tracking system you can have high level of core presence (vividness), a high level of extended presence (engagement) but no proto presence (spatial presence).

· If you read a good book while sitting in an comfortable, safe place, extended consciousness will be engaged by media (engagement) but the other layers will not be involved.

· If you are in an immersive VR, but are pre-occupied with personal worries, proto (spatial) and core presence (vividness) will be invoked, but not extended presence.

· The same situation, with particularly uninteresting content of the VR but no dominating personal worries (low engagement) may tend to produce frequent "breaks in presence" (a change or spreading of position on the locus dimension).

We see changes in the locus of presence, such as Slater's (Slater, 2002) "breaks in presence", as illustrating how core consciousness attempts to integrate the three levels. Content entering core consciousness will remain there for as long as it can be integrated with the content of the other layers. If competing contents appear at either of the other two layers, a change in presence locus is possible. The probability and duration of such changes depend on extended consciousness; attention is likely to be captured by whatever is most relevant to the goals of the extended self, whether this is a stimulus from the real world or a mental event such as a sudden thought. Even the occurrence of a new vivid stimulus, such as a loud sound (attracting core presence), or a break in bodily continuity such as a cable obstructing movement in a VR (attracting proto presence) will only have temporary effects. Once extended consciousness has judged the event as no longer relevant, the self will revert to the previous content of core consciousness (Spagnolli & Gamberini, 2002).

Recently, Slater (2003) has claimed that presence is determined only by form, but our three-layer model of presence suggests that this is an oversimplification. We suggest that proto presence is determined only by form, core presence by both form and content, and extended presence only by content. The integration of presence can occur in either the real or a virtual world. In the case of a virtual world, we need to provide both appropriate form and meaningful content. Presence in the real world depends only on content, on what we experience as happening to us in the here and now, since the form is provided and is always appropriate.

To maximize experienced presence in virtual environments we must design in a way that allows integration of the three layers. As we have seen, this is technically demanding at the lower levels. We need to provide as much immersion as possible, integrating proto (spatial) and core (sensory) presence. To integrate extended presence, the events and entities experienced in the virtual environment must have significance for the participant. One promising approach is to design a role for the participant as a performer in a drama (Nath, 2001). It appears that if the performer becomes emotionally or intellectually engaged by the events in an appropriately immersive environment, high levels of presence can be achieved (Waterworth et al., 2002). In this situation, the organism responds as if what happens in a mediated environment is real, in the fullest sense. Because of this, an immersive VR with appropriately engaging content may be a uniquely effective means of addressing personal dispositions of real significance for the individual concerned.
4 Conclusions

The purpose of presence is to provide a basis for the organism to separate events that occur only within the self from external events that may act on the self. Presence is experienced as a unitary feeling, a feeling of being in a world that exists outside of the self. We have suggested that contributions to the intensity of this feeling can come from three layers of the self, and we refer to these as proto presence, core presence and extended presence. The more the three layers are integrated (focused on the same events) the stronger the intensity of the presence feeling.

The difference in presence experienced through different media can be explained by the fact that many media influence only a limited number of layers. In a compelling book reading only extended consciousness is involved, and with a movie experience we can modify both core presence and extended presence but not proto presence. Only in immersive virtual reality are all the three layers of consciousness modified by the media experience. We suggest that this gives immersive VR a privileged status as a medium for meaningful experiences.

Appropriate form is needed for high presence, but reality judgement is not only a matter of form. We are more likely to attend to and assess information that has significance for us. At the same time, our model allows presence to be differentiated from emotional or intellectual engagement and, because of that, from consciousness in general.
5 References

Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Damasio, A. (1999). The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace and Co, Inc.

Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dolan, R. J. (1999). Feeling the neurobiological self. Nature, 401, 847-848.

Farber, I. (2001). The world within the skull. Nature, 413, 776-777.

Gregory, R. L. (1998a). Brainy mind. British Medical Journal, 317, 1693-1695.

Gregory, R. L. (1998b). Eye and Brain: The psychology of seeing (Vol. Oxford): Oxford University Press.

IJsselsteijn, W. A., & Riva, G. (2003). Being There: The experience of presence in mediated environments. In G. Riva, F. Davide & W. A. IJsselsteijn (Eds.), Being There: Concepts, effects and measurements of user presence in synthetic environments (pp. 3-16). Amsterdam: IOS Press. http://www.emergingcommunication.com/volume5.html.

Janoff-Bulman, R., & Frantz, C. M. (1997). The impact of trauma on meaning: From meaningless world to meaningful life. In M. Power & C. R. Brewin (Eds.), The transformation of meaning in psychological therapies (pp. 91-106). New York: Wiley.

Llinás, R. R. (2001). I of the vortex: From Neurons to Self. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Llinás, R. R., & Pare, D. (1991). Of dreaming and wakefulness. Neuroscience, 44, 521-535.

Metzinger, T. (1999). The hint half guessed. Scientific American, 11, 184-189.

Nath, S, (2001). Emotion Based Narratives: A New Approach to Creating Story Experiences in Immersive Virtual Environments. MA Thesis, Central Saint Martin's College of Art and Design, London, UK.

Sheets-Johnstone, M. (1998). Consciousness: A Natural History. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 5 (3) 260-294.

Slater, M. (2002). Presence and the sixth sense. Presence: Teleoperators, and Virtual Environments, 11(4), 435–439.

Slater, M. (2003). A Note on Presence Terminology. Presence-Connect, 3, (3), January.

Slater, M., & Steed, A. (2000). A Virtual Presence counter. Presence: Teleoperators, and Virtual Environments, 9(5), 413-434.

Spagnolli, A., & Gamberini, L. (2002, 9-11 October). Immersion/Emersion: Presence in hybrid environments. Paper presented at the Presence 2002: Fifth Annual International Workshop, Porto, Portugal.

Waterworth, J. A., & Waterworth, E. L. (2001). Focus, Locus, and Sensus: The three dimensions of virtual experience. Cyberpsychology and Behavior, 4(2), 203-213.

Waterworth, J. A., & Waterworth, E. L. (2003). The meaning of presence. Presence-Connect, 3 (3), February.

Waterworth, J. A., Waterworth, E. L. and Westling, J. (2002, 9-11 October). Presence as Performance: the mystique of digital participation. Paper presented at the Presence 2002: Fifth Annual International Workshop, Porto, Portugal.

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Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society

This article presents a set of grounded hypotheses on the interplay between
communication and power relationships in the technological context that characterizes
the network society. Based on a selected body of communication literature, and of a
number of case studies and examples, it argues that the media have become the
social space where power is decided. It shows the direct link between politics, media
politics, the politics of scandal, and the crisis of political legitimacy in a global
perspective. It also puts forward the notion that the development of interactive,
horizontal networks of communication has induced the rise of a new form of
communication, mass self-communication, over the Internet and wireless
communication networks. Under these conditions, insurgent politics and social
movements are able to intervene more decisively in the new communication space.
However, corporate media and mainstream politics have also invested in this new
communication space. As a result of these processes, mass media and horizontal
communication networks are converging. The net outcome of this evolution is a
historical shift of the public sphere from the institutional realm to the new
communication space.

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The Ethics of Cyberspace

In this book, Cees J Hamelink proposes an answer to - how should democratic societies organize cyberspace? - that puts human-rights, rather than profit, at the top of the agenda. He argues that conventional ethical approaches are all seriously flawed. There is a growing volume of moral rules, netiquettes and codes of conduct, but they are of little help in solving the moral dilemmas raised by the new technologies. In this book the author analyzes the inadeqacies of current global governance policies and structures that underpin them, and argues for standards which put justice, human security and freedom first.

In this book, Cees J Hamelink proposes an answer to - how should democratic societies organize cyberspace? - that puts human-rights, rather than profit, at the top of the agenda. He argues that conventional ethical approaches are all seriously flawed. There is a growing volume of moral rules, netiquettes and codes of conduct, but they are of little help in solving the moral dilemmas raised by the new technologies. In this book the author analyzes the inadeqacies of current global governance policies and structures that underpin them, and argues for standards which put justice, human security and freedom first.

University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, © 2001, SAGE Publications Ltd

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The Road since Structure Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993,

Edited by James Conant and John Haugeland
336 pages | 6 halftones | 6 x 9 | © 2000

Thomas Kuhn will undoubtedly be remembered primarily for The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a book that introduced one of the most influential conceptions of scientific progress to emerge during the twentieth century. The Road Since Structure, assembled with Kuhn's input before his death in 1996, follows the development of his thought through the later years of his life: collected here are several essays extending and rethinking the perspectives of Structure as well as an extensive, fascinating autobiographical interview in which Kuhn discusses the course of his life and philosophy.

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Cyborg lives?: women's technobiographies

Cyborg Lives? is a groundbreaking collection of women’s autobiographical accounts of everyday relationships with technology. The ‘technobiographies’ presented here describe encounters with technology ranging from CDROMS and web pages to science laboratories, ante-natal screening, nuclear power and applicances in the home. These very personal stories offer insight into lived experience where gender intersects with class, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality, generation, and subcultural identity in shaping technological encounters.

Cyborg Lives? uses Donna Haraway's now well-known cyborg metaphor to examine the centrality of technology to daily life. The result is a series of fascinating life-stories that stimulate thinking about the ways that technology intersects with ordinary, everyday experieces. The volume asserts that, in the twenty-first century, technology is an intrinsic part of our subjectivity - whether we like it or not.

Sally Wyatt wrote the chapter: Plugging into the mother country

Spacio-temporal movements in communities of practice, in which human beings and autonomous systems participate

Any two systems in motion will synchronize and adapt to each other and develop a shared language and/or taxonomy, according to the latest research of Luc Steels at Sony Research Labs in Paris. This happens between human beings as well as between non-human systems. In this position paper I argue, inspired the work of Luc Steels and by Thomas Kuhn’s last writings, that in the interaction between human beings and autonomous systems it is necessary to pay attention to the incommensurability that is part of this interaction. Human beings recognize spacio-temporal movements of each other, which create a ground for interaction. Autonomous systems can be defined in terms of spacio-temporal movements, but are hardly perceived as such by human beings. I argue that next to many other reasons, also the not-recognition of spacio-temporal movements between human beings and autonomous systems causes serious flaws in understanding and communication. To be able to address this issue I take the position that both human beings as well as autonomous systems participate in the specific community in which they are located and interact. Being participant in a community involves making contributions to the community, taking responsibility and being part of the evaluation of cause and effect in this community. Being a participant in a community one contributes to the language and concepts a community shares. However, when things go wrong between human beings in a community the self-correctional dynamics that evolve are based on guilt and shame, while an autonomous system provides a ‘no match’. Human drivers like hope, solidarity, compassion and love are not recognized as such by autonomous systems. Nevertheless, human beings are bound to attribute a variety of feelings to autonomous systems because they perform tasks, give feedback and are capable of evaluating formulated intentions. Human beings can perceive autonomous systems as participants in a community in their own right.

Any two systems in motion will synchronize and adapt to each other and develop a shared language and/or taxonomy, according to the latest research of Luc Steels at Sony Research Labs in Paris. This happens between human beings as well as between non-human systems. In this position paper I argue, inspired the work of Luc Steels and by Thomas Kuhn’s last writings, that in the interaction between human beings and autonomous systems it is necessary to pay attention to the incommensurability that is part of this interaction. Human beings recognize spacio-temporal movements of each other, which create a ground for interaction. Autonomous systems can be defined in terms of spacio-temporal movements, but are hardly perceived as such by human beings. I argue that next to many other reasons, also the not-recognition of spacio-temporal movements between human beings and autonomous systems causes serious flaws in understanding and communication. To be able to address this issue I take the position that both human beings as well as autonomous systems participate in the specific community in which they are located and interact. Being participant in a community involves making contributions to the community, taking responsibility and being part of the evaluation of cause and effect in this community. Being a participant in a community one contributes to the language and concepts a community shares. However, when things go wrong between human beings in a community the self-correctional dynamics that evolve are based on guilt and shame, while an autonomous system provides a ‘no match’. Human drivers like hope, solidarity, compassion and love are not recognized as such by autonomous systems. Nevertheless, human beings are bound to attribute a variety of feelings to autonomous systems because they perform tasks, give feedback and are capable of evaluating formulated intentions. Human beings can perceive autonomous systems as participants in a community in their own right.

CHI 2009, April 4 – April 9, 2009, Boston, MA, USA
ACM 978-1-60558-247-4/08/04.
Keywords
Witnessed presence, incommensurability, man-machine interaction, taxonomy, spacio-temporal movements, human potential, guilt, shame, no-match, presence

ACM classification words
H5M. Information Interfaces and presentation (e.g.HCI): miscellaneous

1. Introduction
In a community people who are involved in social interaction can be understood as actors, who are following social rules [1]. An actor ‘thinks’ through the clash between intention and realization and this clash happens on the physical, the emotional and the cognitive level as well [2]. Also autonomous systems function in a community, follow rules and operate on different levels, yet these are not psychologically and/or sociologically defined. The clash between intention and realization is important for autonomous systems, which is why they can ‘learn’. However, its physical condition can be hard to perceive and is of a different nature which only few human beings who are participating in a community will be able to understand and act upon. The emotional clash between intention and realization of an autonomous system is absent, even though some systems are designed to provoke the attribution of feelings in fellow human participants in a specific community. Such attributed feelings can be highly complex, but they do not affect internal functioning of the system. A ‘cognitive clash’ may happen provided the rationality of the autonomous system is accepted as such. This clash will generate a ‘match’ or ‘no- match’ in the first place, but can lead to apparently complex behaviour since the processing time of autonomous systems is often beyond human perception. And this may inspire more processes of emotional attributions, which will influence how the evolution of the community with all its participants, human and non-human, will occur.
Through interactions participants shape the community they are part of. A participant in a community, who is involved in collaboration, will have an image of the other collaborating actors. Whether it is informed by curiosity and attention, or whether it is just an uninformed stereotypical image, human beings judge each other’s presence in relation to their own presence. The witnessed presence of others and the awareness of being witnessed ‘tune’ the presence of the people involved. This ‘tuning’ deeply influences how interactions after will proceed. It can be argued that an autonomous system has witnessed presence as well; it is capable of witnessing others and can be engineered to notice when it is being witnessed. When an autonomous system evaluates formulated intentions before it executes the next act, it can learn fast and actually, one can argue, will develop its own ‘tuning’ mechanisms. The question appears to be how the ‘tuning capacity’ of an autonomous system will be perceived in order to have its witnessing and witnessed presence be accepted or not.

2. Communities of practice
Inspired by the way the evolutionary process develops Thomas Kuhn argues, that every specialty functions in a ‘niche’, which is perceived as the world. For people, or actors, the niche that they form part of, ‘is ‘ the world. It is where communities live. Lexicons evolve between different individuals and all contribute to a deeper structure of taxonomies that characterize that specific community. The structure of lexicons of individual participants in a community do not have to be identical, but “mutually congruent ones”, as Kuhn suggests. Such a congruent structure of a conceptual framework has to be shared to enable people to understand each other. Kuhn argues that lexicons and taxonomies evolve from communities that interact and can only be fully understood “as grounded in the community it serves” [3].
Research by Luc Steels and colleagues [4-5] also suggests that language evolves from interaction between any two systems in which processes of attribution, synchronization and adaptation take place. Such systems can consist of human beings only or include human-machine interactions as well. Steels research suggests that also technological systems amongst them selves will synchronize and adapt to each other, provided certain rules are in place. This implies that in the clash between intention and realization, witnessed presence between any two participants in a community generates significant input. Also autonomous systems witness, interact and in doing so they contribute to lexicons and taxonomies in the community they function. This perspective leads to the conclusion that when focusing on an autonomous system, we actually have to consider this autonomous system as a full participant in the community of actors in which it functions.

Being part of a community means one is not ruling the community, but like any other member one can be touched, moved and changed by the events that occur in that community. The community is able to change the actors involved and being able to change requires a certain vulnerability and openness as well as a certain dependency on the community one is involved. The dependency of an autonomous system towards a community is different from the dependency a human being will have, just as is the openness an autonomous system can perform is different from the openness a human being can have. Nevertheless human beings and autonomous systems both participate in communities in which they interact with each other.

To be able to interact, Kuhn argues, members of the community have to share certain concepts or no interaction would be possible. This accords with the perception that collaborating actors share terrains of commensurability and also terrains of incommensurability, otherwise they could not collaborate. How to understand where one shares concepts with an autonomous system and when not? And how will the autonomous system recognize another actor’s concepts? When analyzing how interactions between human participants with not identical lexicons happen, Kuhn makes a remarkable analysis and discards the notion of true and false when discussing the contributions of human beings to communities’ practices. “The ways of being–in the–world which a lexicon provides are not candidates for true/false”, he writes [3].
Transposing his suggestion to autonomous systems, may shed some light on why autonomous systems can be accepted as participant in a community at all. Actors develop their lexicons and taxonomies, and their deeper structures for these, in the communities they operate in. They do this as ‘thinking’ actors, through the clash between intention and realization, in order to make things work, to communicate, to find common ground and to share knowledge and create new things. The way they do this is via taxonomies that are grounded in communities and can only be understood in relation to these communities. The question for the actor is not whether something is true or false, but whether it works and taxonomies serve this need for things to work.

When considering that an autonomous system fully participates with its presence in a community, Kuhn’s notion that communities in their niches create taxonomies, which help actors to be–in–the–world, opens up perspectives for understanding the significant role that autonomous systems and their mediated presence’s already play in our daily lives.
Whether we discuss the social functioning of a car, an ATM machine or a smart database, it is actually amazing how easily people accept autonomous systems in their day-to-day lives. This acceptance originates from the fact that the system works and delivers, and doing so it contributes to the living practice of a community. There is no concern with the question whether they are true or false, they act.

The more the presence of an autonomous system is accepted, the more it functions in a community as part of its reality. It will be a contributing factor to the taxonomies that this community develops. Taxonomy involves hierarchies, grammar, concepts and words. Literal action and words of the autonomous system will contribute, but also the underlying formats of interaction and concepts of for example ‘cause and effect’ influence how the community develops and its participants change. In this process however, a major distinction between human beings and an autonomous system are the dynamics that regulate how mistakes and faults are allowed to influence the system. In human communities shame and guilt are major drivers of self correctional behaviour, while autonomous systems offer a ‘no-match’. The no-match is a very different ontological position from guilt or shame. The latter induce trajectories of new behaviour in which intentions to self correct and obtain forgiveness dominate. No-match seems to be a neutral state, nothing more than a consequence of a yes and no choice. However, no-match can have great impact on other participants as well as on the community as such. This impact does not guide new internal actions of the system, even though other participants may be capable to ‘set the system free’. The implications of the dynamic of self correctional behaviour between shame and guilt versus no-match as a driver for adaptation, require further research.

3. Tracing spatiotemporal trajectories
The big hurdle to establish meaningful interactions between participants in a community is to overcome incommensurability - the fundamental not sharing of an understanding - between human beings, between human beings and autonomous systems as well as between different autonomous systems.
The judgement of other participants presence’s, whether well–informed or full of prejudice, or not, influences the interaction between different actors. Thomas Kuhn, in his last writing, explores the notion of incommensurability. He never managed to finish his book before he died in 1996, so we can only guess where his argument might have led. However, Kuhn’s suggestion resonates with the latest insights in brain research by scientists like Antonio Damasio [6-7] and Luc Steels [4-5], and it resonates with the proposed understanding of the sense of presence of Riva, Waterworth and Waterworth as well. [8]

“A final remark will close this sketch of my current views on incommensurability. I have described those views as concerned with words and with lexical taxonomy, and I shall continue in that mode: the sort of knowledge I deal with comes in explicit verbal or related symbolic forms. But it may clarify what I have in mind to suggest that I might more appropriately speak of concepts than of words. What I have been calling a lexical taxonomy might, that is, better be called a conceptual scheme, where the ‘very notion’ of a conceptual scheme is not that of a set of beliefs but of a particular operating mode of a mental module prerequisite to having beliefs, a mode that at once supplies and bounds the set of beliefs it is possible to conceive. Some such taxonomic module I take to be prelinguistic and possessed by animals. Presumably it evolved originally for the sensory, most obviously for the visual, system. In the book I shall give reasons for supposing that it developed from a still more fundamental mechanism which enables individual living organisms to reidentify other substances by tracing their spatiotemporal trajectories.” [3].

Witnessing the presence of others informs us about the identity of others and these identities are, among other things, formed by ‘conceptual schemes’. This quote from Kuhn has inspired me to reflect upon the effect of performing a practice over time and how this performing of a practice will actually change the structures in the brain, even the conceptual structures in the brain that influence perception and behaviour. What is the difference between doing the dishes every day or loading and emptying the dishwasher? If people work with hard materials like stone, steel or wood using their hands, how does it influence their conceptual framework? Does a nurse have a very different brain structure to a composer of music or a London cab driver? Brain research suggests that our actions continually influence how our neurons develop, and not only in childhood. Older people’s brains also continue developing according to the actions they perform.

Brain structures, together with other input, influence the images we have of ourselves and others, including the images we have of autonomous systems with which we interact. Damasio points out that scientifically we do not know how we go from sensory input to conceiving images, even though the fact that we conceive images is well–established [7]. And from the perspective of the autonomous system, how will it be affected by its actions? Will it change and will this change be perceivable? And human beings, can they recognize the change of identity in a system? Can the system decide upon wanting to change its identity for example?
Kuhn‘s idea that a fundamental mechanism “enables living organisms to reidentify other substances by tracing their spaciotemporal trajectories” may be proven to be very worthwhile because it would explain how we often ‘recognize’ other actors intuitively before we know how our communication with this person and/or system will work out. Kuhn’s words can be understood as an insight into witnessed presence. This may also imply that when confronted with incommensurability, the clash between intention and realization does not only occur cognitively, but physical and emotional input may also ‘shape’ the actor as much as the cognitive clash does.

What would this mean when being involved with an autonomous system? How will we recognize its spatiotemporal trajectory? How can such a spatiotemporal trajectory be perceivable? When most of its output and input is not perceivable for us, could a representation of a process be perceived as a genuine spatiotemporal trajectory? When this autonomous system is distributed, how can its ’footprint’ be perceived? How will the clash between intention and realization happen, if at all, when no conceptual framework has been collaboratively developed between the system and other human participants?

How does seeing a result of an interaction with an autonomous system, whether successful or not, influence our consciousness? How does acquired technological or editorial skill influence our way of thinking? And how do processes of attribution influence a possible emotional experience in the clash between intention and realization between a human being and an autonomous system?

Kuhn’s suggestion does resonate with the experiences of online collaborations between human beings. It is very difficult to technologically mediate the possible pre–linguistic conceptual frameworks that characterize a human being, and which are perceived by other actors. The limited sensorial repertoire of mediated presence limits communication on very fundamental levels. Just as context is extremely difficult to mediate, up to the logical point where it is impossible, any conceivable inner pre–linguistic conceptual frameworks face the same (impossible) challenge.

When being involved with an autonomous system the clash of presences seems to be only more intense. The time frame and experience of a system as well as its spatial presence, including its possible real-life-footprint, are of a different order. It’s strength, length of life and vulnerability as well. It’s sense of life, even though it is designed by people to act, needs very different ingredients to survive and be well than most actors will be aware of. Nevertheless many actors can communicate with it, will attribute qualities to it and will eventually synchronize and adapt to it.

Incommensurability is a significant hurdle that has to be tackled in the collaborations between actors. The suggestion that we may identify a deeper structure of thinking, a conceptual framework that is reflected in a lexical taxonomy, could add to the understanding of why certain actors work well together while others do not. To mediate nuances of enacted identities is difficult and may even be impossible. When being involved with an autonomous system, it has to provide appropriate actions. More and more these systems now engage in a personalized way with the human being it is involved with. For an autonomous system to fully function in the community it participates, it has to make up for the lack of recognition of its spatio-temporal trajectory or find ways to convey this.

4.Discussion
Only when we perceive the human being as not being part of the autonomous system, incommensurability between human beings and autonomous systems can be addressed. Also, when making the distinction between the human being and the autonomous system, this provides us with the opportunity to judge possible interactions from the perspective of safeguarding human dignity as well. Doing so, it is possible to maximize the mobilization of the human potential to act towards survival and well-being, in which the essence of presence is to be found.

When human beings are confronted with the presence of an autonomous system, processes of attribution have great impact and are easily perceived as a quality of the system itself. This confusion, which can result in a not appropriate perception of the environment and what happens in it, may lead to a confused steering towards well being and survival of the community as such.

Human beings are mortal beings and when the sense of presence is maximized, people’s natural presence well being will ultimately determine what mediated and autonomous systems presence will be considered part of the community and which one will be discarded of. In the process of accepting an autonomous system as being participant in a community, the orchestration and design of its witnessing and witnessed presence is distinct. To be able to recognize spacio-temporal trajectories of other participants is a requirement ‘tuning’ participant’s presence’s, which is necessary for tackling incommensurability and being able to interact and contribute to lexicons, taxonomies and concepts participants in a community share.

References
[1] Giddens, Anthony. 1984. The constitution of Society, Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Cambridge: Polity Press.
[2] Nevejan, Caroline. 2007. Presence and the Design of Trust, PhD diss. University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands
[3] Kuhn, Thomas S. 2000. The road since structure, philosophical essays, 1970–1993, with an autobiographical interview. Editors.James Conant and John Haugeland. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. pp: 94-104
[4] Steels, Luc. 1999. The talking heads experiment. Special pre–edition for Laboratorium Antwerpen. Brussels: VUB Artificial Intelligence Laboratory.
[5] Steels, Luc. 2006. Experiments on the mergence of human communication.
In Trends in Cognitive Sciences (10) 8: 347–349.
Retrieved from Steles’ website arti.vub.ac.be/~steels/ (accessed 7 July, 2006).
[6] Damasio, Antonio. 2000. The Feeling of What Happens. Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness. London: Vintage, Random House.
[7] Damasio, Antonio. 2004. Looking for Spinoza, Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain. London: Vintage, Random House.
[8] Riva, Giuseppe, John A. Waterworth and Eva L. Waterworth. 2004. The Layers of Presence: A Bio–cultural Approach to Understanding Presence in Natural and Mediated Environments. In CyberPsychology & Behavior (7) 4: 402–416.

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Presence Design: Mediated Spaces Extending Architecture

This dissertation explores mediating presence from an architectural perspective. In juxtaposing the tools of the designer (e.g. drafting, prototyping, visual/textual/spatial forms of montage) with those of architectural theory, this thesis seeks to extend the disciplinary boundaries of architecture by observing its assimilation of other media practices (Gullström, C. 2010. Presence Design: Mediated Spaces Extending Architecture. Doctoral thesis. Stockholm: KTH)

Witnessing beyond recognition

Written by Kelly Oliver, professor of Philosophy, this book is foundational to research on witnessing. Oliver argues witnessing is defined by address-ability, response-ability and clarity of subject position.

Academic Journal: Witnessed Presence

In this special issue of AI & Society, Journal for Knowledge, Culture and Commmunication, published by Springer 2012 11 scientists and academics explore the notion of Witnessed Presence.

Presence and the Design of Trust (download)

This dissertation explores how the design of presence and the design of trust affect one another. In this study 2 networked events in the ealy days of Internet have been analyzed, the Galactic Hacker Party in 1989 en the Seropositive Ball in 1990. To better understand how presence and trust are intertwined, the YUTPA framework is developed suggesting that 4 dimensions of time, place, action and relation define how people perform presence and establish trust as result.

The Paper: Witnessed Presence and the YUTPA framework

This paper introduces the notion of witnessed presence arguing that the performative act of witnessing presence is fundamental to dynamics of negotiating trust and truth. As the
agency of witnessed presence in mediated presence differs from natural presence orchestration between natural and mediated presences is needed. The YUTPA framework,
introduced in this paper, depicts 4 dimensions to define witnessed presence: time, place, action and relation. This framework also provides a context for design of trust in products
and services, as illustrated for a number of illustrative scenarios.

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Ethical implications of new dynamics

The simple fact of ‘being alive’ generates a person’s natural presence. During the past century information- and communication technology has made it possible to facilitate mediation of human presence beyond the imagination of ever before. People transcend time and place many times in the course of a day, in different roles and different stances. In many situations physical presence is replaced or complemented by one or more types of mediated presence. As millions of people now use such technology every day, social systems for negotiating trust and truth are faced with new dynamics. The ethical implications of these new dynamics demand rigorous analysis of the unprecedented impact on the social structures currently valued. This paper argues that witnessed presence is key to determining trust and truth in natural and mediated environments.

The simple fact of ‘being alive’ generates a person’s natural presence. During the past century information- and communication technology has made it possible to facilitate mediation of human presence beyond the imagination of ever before. People transcend time and place many times in the course of a day, in different roles and different stances. In many situations physical presence is replaced or complemented by one or more types of mediated presence. As millions of people now use such technology every day, social systems for negotiating trust and truth are faced with new dynamics. The ethical implications of these new dynamics demand rigorous analysis of the unprecedented impact on the social structures currently valued. This paper argues that witnessed presence is key to determining trust and truth in natural and mediated environments.

Chapter 2 positions the notion of witnessed presence in the context of relevant literature. This section discusses three aspects of presence encountered in the literature that are strongly related to the concept of witnessed presence. Chapter 3 introduces witnessed presence as key to the negotiation of trust and truth. Chapter 4 presents the YUTPA framework, being with You in Unity of Time Place and Action, and the four dimensions of witnessed presence with which trust is associated. Chapter 5 illustrates the YUTPA framework as a method for design and Chapter 6 discusses future directions for research.

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Being here: spaces of observation, agency and performitivity

Presence research over the last 30 years has been mostly concerned with the understanding and creation of human experiences in virtual environments. Tele-presence, and the potential occurrence of social presence and co-presence within virtual environments, focus on the creation and monitoring of the sense of ‘being there’.

Presence research over the last 30 years has been mostly concerned with the understanding and creation of human experiences in virtual environments. Tele-presence, and the potential occurrence of social presence and co-presence within virtual environments, focus on the creation and monitoring of the sense of ‘being there’.

Many detailed contributions to the field (refs) have been made but no agreement on definitions and distinctions has been reached (Lombard & Jones 2007). From a philosophical perspective Luciano Floridi critiques the current conceptual foundation of tele-presence theory and proposes a new model of presence as ‘successful observation’ (Floridi 2005). Floridi argues that tele-presence is used as ‘a definition of epistemic failure’, which is primarily founded in perception. Even interaction is analyzed as the perception of interaction and not as the interaction itself. Floridi argues that the current tele-presence models do not pay tribute to the complex dynamics between presence and absence, nor does it take the different levels of abstraction and spaces of observation into account: “For surely the doctor tele-operating on a patient is still present, independently of the doctor’s perception (or lack thereof) of the technological mediation.” (Floridi 2005: 660). Floridi argues that local and remote spaces of observation and different levels of analysis define presence.
Multiple experiences of different kinds of presence only become more complex, more hybrid, less linear and more fragmented. In every product or process the dichotomy between human nature and non–human nature can be distinguished and at the same time hybrids are almost immediately accepted in their own right (Latour 1993). Physical, natural presence, the traditional basis for determining trust and truth in the context of social activities (Giddens 1984), is no longer the only determinant. When being in a place, in an on- or offline or mixed environment, ‘action’ generates a connection between “the material and symbolic resources that constitute a place and setting the terms of the agent’s presence” (Spagnolli & Gamberini 2005). However, in these new environments key-concepts of, for example, distance, connection, impact or locality, have been deeply affected by the use of technologies (Virillio 2008). Tracking and tracing, collecting and distributing, presence and absence have changed the scale and patterns of communication. They have changed how people act and how they relate to each other. Because the time-space configurations of social structures have changed, also the agency of the actor has changed (Giddens 1984). As a consequence the negotiation of trust and truth has acquired new dynamics, because not only the spaces of observation are more complex, also the agency of the witness is transformed.
Judicial systems in Europe have developed over the last 2000 years and as such they reflect knowledge of social structures that human kind has known so far in this part of the world. In judicial contexts a witness is a crucial figure and courts demand a witness to be sworn in. Having been an observer is not enough; a witness has to take the stand and take responsibility for the report on what has been observed and experienced. The fact that an action that is witnessed becomes a deed upon which can be testified emphasizes the possible impact of the act of witnessing. While witnessing a witness can decide to intervene in the witnessed situation as well. When witnessed, the executing power of the same action has changed for both the one who witnesses as well as of for the one who is being witnessed.
The notion of witnessed presence proposed in this paper emphasizes how presence is performed, can be performed or cannot be performed in the context of a communication process in which multiple types of presence play a role. In addition to understanding the witness as a chosen position in a specific situation, ‘having presence in the world’ can also be understood from the perspective of performitivity (Butler 1993). In performative acts biological conditions and social identities merge into, for example, the performance of gender or sexuality. When studying presence in on- and offline environments the notion of presence as ‘enacting being’ is informative. Also language can be performative, when words become deeds (Austin 1962). As most mediated environments are dependent on written code and commands to enable presence in mediated environments, the performative perspective on presence contributes to the understanding of presence as a chosen ‘enactment’ facilitating certain actions and excluding others.
Luc Steels argues that processes of attribution, synchronization and adaptation define the performance of presence in natural and mediated presences (Steels 2006). ‘Tuning’ presence happens in both (Nevejan 2007). In social structures the understanding of different types of mediated presence is deeply influenced by the development of media schemata. Media schemata, define how mediated presence will be accepted and how they execute power in the social structures in which they function (IJsselsteijn 2004). Media schemata, change over time and are different in the variety of (sub) cultures around the globe. The way, for example, television, email or an SMS is understood and accepted, is defined by such media schemata.
The notion of witnessed presence as performance resonates with Floridi’s critique on current tele-presence theory. Floridi emphasizes the dynamics between local and remote spaces of observation in which the local space of observation is defined by physical presence that is bound to space and time. The notion of witnessed presence shifts the tele-presence focus from ‘being there’ to a focus on presence as ‘being-here’ in relation to many other here’s and there’s available. It is in the being-here that the perspective on agency and performitivity of presence is to be found as argued in the following paragraph.

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Conatus: depth in relation, data-identities and moral distance

Riva, Waterworth & Waterworth argue from a bio-cultural approach, that presence manifests in the strive for well-being and survival (Riva, Waterworth & Waterworth 2004). From this perspective the notion of witnessed presence can be considered to have agency and performativity as well.

Riva, Waterworth & Waterworth argue from a bio-cultural approach, that presence manifests in the strive for well-being and survival (Riva, Waterworth & Waterworth 2004). From this perspective the notion of witnessed presence can be considered to have agency and performativity as well.

The witness chooses to take the stand, the sense of presence makes her or him be aware and act. The perception and awareness of ‘something is happening’ has impact in natural presence because the conatus, first introduced by Spinoza as the quest for well-being and survival, operates on all levels of the organism of the human being, who is trying to regulate constantly towards homeostasis (Damasio 2004). From a neurological perspective Antonio Damasio states that the brain constantly distinguishes between what is beneficial for life and what is detrimental to life. Damasio argues that in the perception of something happening emotions and feelings are crucial indicators of where well–being and survival are to be found. People steer away from pain, trying to restore the homeostasis. People steer away from unhappiness, trying to make things better. The ‘conatus’ triggers a human being to take care of him or herself, and it also triggers the human being to take care of ‘other selves’ to keep the environment healthy and safe. Social conventions and ethical rules may be seen as extensions of the basic homeostatic arrangements at the level of society and culture. An individual’s drive for survival can also be considered to be the fundament for ethical behaviour towards others (Damasio 2004).
Mediated presences contribute to daily lives, knowledge and experience significantly. However, the natural presence of the actors involved remains to be distinct because natural presence has to physically survive with or without the use of technology. From this perspective it seems reasonable to argue that mediated presences should only have impact as far as that they do not harm nor confuse the sense of natural presence that helps human beings to steer away from pain towards well-being and survival.
When ‘enacting being’ the depth in relation between human beings sets the context for how communication is understood (Nevejan 2007). Strangers, people with whom a human being has no relation, are merely perceived as information (Buber 1937). This resonates with the experience that in the midst of all the data streams that human kind produces today, it seems that to be able to hear the voices of suffering has become more problematic than ever (Baxi 1999). To be able to hear a voice of suffering requires the capacity to have complex feelings like compassion and solidarity which do not evolve from the perception of information only. To develop these feelings human beings have to be part of social structures and engaged in human relationships over time (Damasio 2004).
Because mediated presences offer limited sensorial input, limited mediation of context, and limited possibilities to act, a moral distance is easily adopted towards people a human being does not know (Hamelink 2000). Current technology facilitates not only a mediation of presence, they also collect, match, duplicate, distribute and produce ‘data-identities’ (Nevejan 2007). Human beings have little control over their ‘data-identity’ in current technological systems while the data-identity of a human being has acquired great agency in the social structures in which human beings live. There is little control on how data are created, there is hardly any control on how data are matched, travel or even on how long they exist. One can argue that the systems themselves have become participants in communities and are executing their own specific ways of witnessed presence (Brazier & van der Veer 2009). The confrontation between a human being and his/her data-identity and the effect of being witnessed by technological systems, which imperceptibly invade the personal sphere all the time, has hardly been studied. However, having agency is a requirement for being a witness and to participate in the negotiation of trust and truth. Because human beings have so little influence over their data-identities in the social structures upon which they depend, they adopt a moral distance towards the own self as well (Nevejan 2007). One of the possible implications of adopting a moral distance towards one’s self is that feelings and emotions will not evolve as they should, which leads to the ultimate consequence that a human being is less capable of steering towards one’s own well-being and survival. Also the sense for a safe social environment diminishes because as a result of the moral distance to the self, also the moral distance to other human beings increases.
Although related to mediated presence, concepts like homeostasis and conatus are different: there is a different sense of causality, limited sensorial input, local and implicit knowledge can hardly be mediated and the connection most often provides context. Context as reference, that a place with an embedded culture offers, has disappeared (Nevejan 2007). Also, consistency in identity, through actions and feedback to these actions, requires special attention when being involved in mediated presence. The way emotions and feelings are triggered in mediated presence, and the process of attribution, synchronization and adaptation happen, can be significantly different from a natural presence context. When being a witness in mediated environments the steering capacity of emotions and feelings towards well-being and survival has to be understood and analyzed in different ways. The agency of witnessed presence is different in natural presence from the agency a witness has in mediated environments.

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Collaboration: spatiotemporal movements, incommensurability and collective authored outcomes

Higher trust makes collaborations more smooth and effective and therefore also more cost-effective as Karen Armstrong claims (Kleiner 2002). To create a ‘trusted’ sense of place in only mediated environments is a challenge, which is why ‘being a witness’ and creating a ‘to be witnessed presence’ in mediated environments requires attention.

Higher trust makes collaborations more smooth and effective and therefore also more cost-effective as Karen Armstrong claims (Kleiner 2002). To create a ‘trusted’ sense of place in only mediated environments is a challenge, which is why ‘being a witness’ and creating a ‘to be witnessed presence’ in mediated environments requires attention.

In social networking sites, like Facebook and Linkedin, the purpose is to connect people to other human beings and therefore these sites facilitate a witnessing and being witnessed around the clock and from all over the globe. The popularity of these sites proves that new configurations are being invented to connect natural and mediated presence to create a trusted sense of place in which people can witness each other, possibly testify and possibly act upon what they witness. The context these mediated environments offer (in addition to the platform they provide), appears to be the ‘being in relation with other human beings’ it self. It appears that people trust what they perceive on these sites for 100% (ten Kate 2009). The ‘neutrality’ of technology generates a great sense of trustworthiness even though most users are not even aware of license agreements to which they have agreed. People argue that the information about others is also to be trusted because all information links to real life situations, networks, cultures and people. Any untruth would surface easily because of this (ten Kate 2009).
In professional realms, be it in geographically distributed teams of collaboration or not, technologies play a crucial role in the work processes and new configurations between on- and offline work are being invented (Vasileiadou 2009). As a result, how and when to meet in real life, in natural presence, has become a choice. In collaborations a significant hurdle to over come between the participants involved is incommensurability, the fundamental not sharing of an understanding. Thomas Kuhn has been studying this phenomenon extensively. To be able to interact, Kuhn argues, members of the community have to share certain concepts or no interaction is possible (Kuhn 2000). Collaborating actors share terrains of commensurability and also terrains of incommensurability, otherwise they can not collaborate. Witnessing the presence of others informs about the identity of others and these identities are, among other things, formed by conceptual schemes as well as by the spatiotemporal trajectories that are identified (Kuhn 2000). To be able to recognize spatiotemporal trajectories of other participants is a requirement ‘tuning’ participant’s presence’s, which is necessary for tackling incommensurability and being able to interact. However, identifying spatiotemporal trajectories in mediated presence is very different from identifying spatiotemporal trajectories in natural presence. To mediate nuances of spatiotemporal trajectories of enacted beings is difficult and may even be impossible. Just as the sense for well-being and survival is difficult to mediate since it is highly context dependent and context can hardly be mediated at all (Nevejan2007). Therefore the conclusion can be drawn that when issues of ethical nature are at stake, when questions are asked about what is good to do and what is beneficial for life, people have to meet in natural presence. Only in natural presence the shared sense of what is good for well-being and survival can be ‘collectively authored’ in such a way that all stakeholders will base their future acts on the ‘collectively authored outcomes’ that have been agreed upon (Humphries & Jones 2006).

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Witnessed presence is key in negotiating trust and truth

Both trust and truth are not given entities but processes of negotiation. Trust builds and breaks down, truth changes according to perspective. Also both processes are dependent on human perception and interaction for which reason they are subjected to complex dynamics in which psychological, sociological, theological, biological, political and economic realities play a role. Nevertheless according to the literature discussed in chapter 2, when discussing presence technologies key dimensions underlying these dynamics can be identified.

Both trust and truth are not given entities but processes of negotiation. Trust builds and breaks down, truth changes according to perspective. Also both processes are dependent on human perception and interaction for which reason they are subjected to complex dynamics in which psychological, sociological, theological, biological, political and economic realities play a role. Nevertheless according to the literature discussed in chapter 2, when discussing presence technologies key dimensions underlying these dynamics can be identified.

Being a witness traditionally meant that a human being was present at a specific time and a specific place. From a judicial perspective being an observer is not enough; to be a witness a human being consciously decides to take responsibility for the report on situation that is witnessed. As a result the report on this act of witnessing is supposed to contribute to the truth. This dynamic of being a witness and taking responsibility for being a witness, can be identified in many realms of society to create trusted and truthful interactions. In commercial contracts, when the stakes are high as in buying shares or a house for example, stakeholders have to be present in front of a notary to sign a contract specifying the date and precise time. In organizational agreements and civic procedures like marriage, the witness is a returning figure. Witnessing is formally orchestrated in these processes to guarantee truthful and trusted interactions and transactions. In informal social environments witnessing, or lying about having witnessed something as in gossip and rumours may happen, is a well known dynamic to create certain (mis) conceptions of other people or events. When discussing ethics of presence technologies, witnessed presence as a notion that plays a role in the negotiation of trust and truth, is useful.
The following three sections discuss four variables related to the concept of witnessed presence: space, time, relation and action.

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Spatiotemporal trajectories

The structure of communication between people is not only defined by the sharing of place and time, but also by the capacity to recognize other beings spatiotemporal trajectories. Being a witness to other people’s presence starts before the moment of interaction. It is pre-linguistic in that sense.

The structure of communication between people is not only defined by the sharing of place and time, but also by the capacity to recognize other beings spatiotemporal trajectories. Being a witness to other people’s presence starts before the moment of interaction. It is pre-linguistic in that sense.

The perception of other human beings movements influences how a witness performs his or her own presence as a consequence. The configuration of space and time defines the space of observation, and defines how the witness’ presence is performed as well. In natural presence this process of ‘staging’ presence in relation to the witnesses around, is very different from staging presence in mediated environments.
The perception and experience of space and time have been part of human existence. In arts as well as in the sciences human kind has been struggling to understand and express these fundamental dimensions of life. The current presence technologies challenge this understanding and experience in unprecedented ways. When focusing on witnessed presence in the context of presence technologies all of the questions about space and time that have ever been asked seem relevant. When trying to understand what happens in a specific situation, when being a witness, those questions have to be asked again because an apparent simple transcending of time and or place actually deeply transforms the concepts that human beings recognize and therefore the way presence is performed as well.

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The possibility to act

In addition to space and time, also the possibility to act influences how presence is performed. In mixed on- and offline environments the possibility to act helps to bridge the different worlds. If there is no possibility to act and a human being is nevertheless witness to enrolling events, people easily adopt a moral distance and doing so detach themselves from the sense for well-being and survival.

In addition to space and time, also the possibility to act influences how presence is performed. In mixed on- and offline environments the possibility to act helps to bridge the different worlds. If there is no possibility to act and a human being is nevertheless witness to enrolling events, people easily adopt a moral distance and doing so detach themselves from the sense for well-being and survival.

Especially in mediated environments where data-identities interact, such a moral distance can even be taken to the own self. Witnessing is an act in which a human being takes responsibility for the act of being witness. If this responsibility is denied because of a lack of possibilities to act, often there seems to be no other option than to detach. Vice versa, a witness who decides to act, and words can be a deed in this sense, breaks the moral distance and becomes an actor in his or her own right.
To be able to act as a witness, having the potential to become an actor, a person needs a sense of what will be good and what will be bad, in order to anticipate an intended effect of one’s action. In on- and offline places where culture is shared, the witness can be aware of the morality around him/her and will know what is good and what is bad for well-being and survival. When a witness does not know the morality of the context in which one witnesses, the witness will be hesitant to use the capacity to act upon what is witnessed because there is no sense of social safety around.
To be a witness and to be part of the negotiation of trust and truth, human beings need the possibility to act as well as an understanding of the possible impact of the act they may or may not do.

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Depth of Relation

The depth of relation between human beings is the fourth variable that defines how witnessing takes place. Witnessing a loved person in on- or offline environments is very different from witnessing a stranger. This relation provides a very strong context in natural as well as in mediated presence.

The depth of relation between human beings is the fourth variable that defines how witnessing takes place. Witnessing a loved person in on- or offline environments is very different from witnessing a stranger. This relation provides a very strong context in natural as well as in mediated presence.

In social relations human beings develop a whole range of psychological states, from simple emotions of like and dislike, to love and hate and more complex feelings like compassion or solidarity. To be a witness to suffering or being witnessed when suffering demands performance of presence and social structures that support. Also passion, joy and success need performance of presence and social structures that support. When focusing on ethics in presence technologies the question that rises is how complex feelings and emotions like compassion, empathy, shame, guilt and others, evolve in mediated presence over time and affect the social structures in which human beings live and survive. Because of the large-scale use of presence technologies, the range and depth of human relationships are undergoing significant change. People can be ‘in touch’ with loved ones thousands of miles away and strangers can become intimate friends even though one has never met in real life before or even intends to do so.
Processes of attribution, synchronization and adaptation have more impact than ever because current presence technologies can only facilitate partial channels of communication and transactions. Because mediated presence is dependent on these processes of attribution, solitary human beings are easily confused about what they perceive. The social structures, in which the mediated presences of other people are perceived, are crucial in the understanding of the trustworthiness and truthfulness of the presences that are witnessed. Even in large social networks the connection to the natural presence of human beings involved, is necessary to create trusted and truthful environments. Also in collaborations it appears to be necessary to meet in natural presence when issues of ethical nature are at stake. In natural presence the ultimate sense of what is good for survival and well-being is strongest and the identification of other human beings and the concepts that are shared, is clearest.
Therefore ethics of presence technologies have to be founded in the natural presence of human beings involved. To better understand the social structures in which witnessed presence operates, the YUTPA framework was developed (Nevejan 2007).

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YUTPA framework

The specific configuration of time, space, action and relation in a certain product or process, in which natural presence, mediated presence and witnessed presence all play a role, enables certain forms of trust and truth to be established while excluding others. Because of the development of mechanical, electrical, electronic and digital technologies, people can act with other people over time and distances in other ways than those that are dictated by physical presence. It is in the specific ‘time and space configuration in which one meets with others in action’ that one set of possibilities and liabilities can be distinguished from another. Such a configuration is called a YUTPA configuration.

The specific configuration of time, space, action and relation in a certain product or process, in which natural presence, mediated presence and witnessed presence all play a role, enables certain forms of trust and truth to be established while excluding others. Because of the development of mechanical, electrical, electronic and digital technologies, people can act with other people over time and distances in other ways than those that are dictated by physical presence. It is in the specific ‘time and space configuration in which one meets with others in action’ that one set of possibilities and liabilities can be distinguished from another. Such a configuration is called a YUTPA configuration.

YUTPA is an acronym for “being with You in Unity of Time, Place and Action”. Time, place, action and relation are dimensions that can have different values between You and not–You, Now and not–Now, Here and not–Here, Do and not–Do as depicted in Figure 1.
The You/not-You dimension refers to the relationship with the other human being(s) with whom one interacts.
The Now/not-Now dimension refers to the sharing of the experience of time, synchronous or asynchronous in past or future.
The Here/not-Here dimension encompasses the sharing of place or not. Depending on how place is defined or experienced this can be geographically small or large, it can also refer to the sense of distance in virtual and online worlds.
The Do/not-Do dimension refers to the possibility to act as part of or as a result of a social interaction.
The word Unity refers to the specific configuration between these four dimensions that is designed in a certain product or process, which makes certain interactions possible while it excludes others. It is a formulation from the perspective of the actor, from the perspective of the person involved. In specific configurations human beings enact their being, witness each other, tune and perform their presences.
In every specific YUTPA configuration different possibilities to delegate trust and to produce and verify particular facts is given. Internet, mobile communication, GIS, and databases have created new YUTPA configurations of communication.
The position this paper takes is that values for ‘presence-ethics’ need to be developed in the relation to the natural presence of the people involved. All contributions, possible destruction, confusion and transformations of other YUTPA configurations have to be valued and judged from the perspective of the natural presence of human beings, and the environment they need, to be well and survive (Nevejan 2007). In this respect it is interesting to notice that most current information and communication technology agenda’s for innovation of truthful and trustworthy environments can be located in the black space of figure 1 in which there is no possibility to act for human beings to be involved. While most human beings love, have children, enjoy life and find trust and truth in the white ‘action’ space of the same figure 1.

Figure 1: The 4 dimensions of time, place, relation and action define how the relation between witnessed presence and the negotiation of trust and truth can be understood. Next to the three axes, the dimension of Action is represented by the black and white parts of the sphere illustrating the possibility to act in the white of ‘clear air’ or the lack of possibilities to act in the black of ‘no oxygen space’. (Graph: Max Bruinsma)

The four action spaces defined by You create a solid ground for social interaction because these interactions are understood in the context of the relation with the other human being. Establishing distrust is as trustworthy in this respect as establishing trust. Feedback from synchronous and asynchronous mediated presences (You/not–Now/not–Here, You/Now/not–Here) may contribute to the building or diminishing of trust provided the context of a relationship supports this process. With strangers especially synchronous communication, as is facilitated by the telephone for example, is perceived as truthful and generates trust.
The four action spaces defined by not–You are more complex and highly dependent upon the delegation of trust. Trust in social structures and trust in technology are required to be able to operate in those spaces, trust between individuals is not the issue here. When sharing time and place, while not knowing other people who are present as in a busy street for example, people treat each other as information. But in such a busy street one can still be a witness and decide to act. In all other three not–You spaces technology is needed for human beings to be present; a presence that manifests itself mostly as data-identity, formatted by technology, which is often outside of the ‘original’ human beings control. In the not–You communication spaces basic trust is delegated to governments and companies to create and maintain systems in trustworthy and truthful manners yet these are not always capable or willing to do so.
The blurring between You and not–You creates confusion as well as solutions. In not–You spaces trust is delegated, moral distance is easily taken, responsibility is harder to sense but the ‘neutrality’ of technology generates a great sense of truth and trustworthiness. Therefore in communication processes, which consist of series of interactions and transactions as well, the orchestration of links between on- and offline moments is crucial for success. Part of the trustworthiness of online banking for example is the fact that there is also a bank in a building, with people with whom one can communicate. Part of the trustworthiness of online banking is also the fact that the ‘real’ bank is subjected to the rule of law.
Between the experience of a human being and the social structures to which trust and truth finding are delegated, specific products or services are accepted or not. By interchanging between mediated and natural, between witnessed and not, between synchronous and asynchronous, between not–You and You spaces, between Here and not–Here, and by offering the possibility to act, communication processes take shape and trust and truth are build up or broken down.

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Applying the YUTPA framework as a method for Design

Over the last two years the YUTPA framework has been used as a method for design in a variety of situations with a variety of people: marketing managers, business people, representatives of larger organizations, government bodies and students of media and design. Trust and truth are context dependent and so is any intervention by design. In this sense the YUTPA method can only function in processes of situational design (Schwarz 2007). In this section a short impression is given of how the YUTPA framework is used as a method for design.

Over the last two years the YUTPA framework has been used as a method for design in a variety of situations with a variety of people: marketing managers, business people, representatives of larger organizations, government bodies and students of media and design. Trust and truth are context dependent and so is any intervention by design. In this sense the YUTPA method can only function in processes of situational design (Schwarz 2007). In this section a short impression is given of how the YUTPA framework is used as a method for design.

Figure 2: Using the image of a sound mixer to tune 4 dimensions of witnessed presence into one configuration to enhance trust. (Graph: Mike de Kreek)

Design of a process with the YUTPA framework involves (1) Analysis of the 4 dimensions with respect to the requirements. (2) Having analyzed the design problem the four dimensions are tuned to different values to explore the impact on the negotiation of trust and truth. (3) When the preferred configuration has been found, the new products or services can be further configured and designed.
Especially in business environments, communication processes are costly. The configuration of not-You, not-Here, not-Now and not-Do (when all the slides are up in figure 2) would to be very cost effective using technological systems, which can run by themselves and incur no personnel costs. However, if clients loose trust in the service because it is too impersonal and hard to control, people will refrain from using it. So a balance between communication costs and ‘trust-investment’ needs to be found.

Discussion

This paper proposes a conceptual framework that facilitates a better understanding of the ethical implications of presence design. Where Floridi proposes to focus on the spaces of observation and levels of abstraction instead of focusing on the perception and experience of the subject as most tele-presence research does, the notion of witnessed presence proposed in this paper takes the sociological perspective of ‘witnssed presence as agency’ in mediated and non-mediated environments to sustain well-being and survival for the individual human being and between human beings as well. It takes the perspective of the individual human being, who, while being present ‘here’ is also present in several ‘there’s’ while interacting and observing others. Having witnessed presence, enacting being in natural and mediated environments, is considered to be an act of performitivity in which biological and social realites merge. To be a witness is an act with distinct consequences, especially with respect to the ethical implications of presence design.
Further research will explore each of the four dimensions in relation to each other. Earlier tele- presence research will be revisited, as will the perspective of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to use the capability approach to translate these values in practical and measurable terms for presence design (Nussbaum 1999). The challenge is how to understand, create and integrate witnessed presence in social structures of system and service designs, so human beings can take full responsibility for their actions and safeguard human dignity for generations to come.
Current research focuses on the implications of witnessed presence for the design of autonomous systems, systems that participate in communities in their own right (Nevejan 2009). With social scientists, artists and designers the concept of witnessed presence is further explored.

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