There is also a possible third physical clash, which is triggered by the infrastructure of information and communication technologies. Tracking and tracing procedures, which are facilitated by surveillance technologies, can not be sensed by people physically, while these technologies may use the physical presence of a person and may have physical consequences for this person. When one hits a wall in natural presence, it can be seen and felt. When one hits a wall because of data streams that deny access, one does not know where and what data is used, how it is obtained and who is in charge of maintaining this data. Until one hits such a ‘data–wall’, most actors are not even aware of its existence. Because people are not aware of the ‘data–walls’, their physical presence is not informed while these ‘data-walls’ regularly impact upon the situation that a person is in.

Physical clashes between intention and realization involve all levels of consciousness. In mediated presence these are not necessarily all involved, which already diminishes the presence experience and the impact a clash may have. The interface that a certain mediating technology offers has a limited sensorial repertoire. The physical consequences of psychological states are generally not experienced as significant in daily life. Infrastructures of information and communication technologies are not sensed either.

For these reasons I would argue that the physical impact of the clash between intention and realization in mediated presence is not as profound as when this clash takes place in natural presence. People operate the technologies, learn quickly how to do this when the feedback is as expected, and find ways to integrate the technologies into their daily lives. The fact that a certain impact does not occur is another reason, I presume, that people easily accept information and communication technologies. The ‘ethical’ confrontation of the effect of mediated presence is hardly rooted in physical experience. Such ethical confrontations are based on physical feelings of happiness and sadness, pleasure and pain, compassion or neglect, as is argued by Antonio Damasio, and which I will discuss later in this section (Damasio 2004). When human rights are violated in natural presence in such a way that physical effects are clear, as is the case with malnutrition and (fear of) violence and torture, for example, the awareness that something that is wrong is taking place is undeniable for all the actors involved, including the people who witness it. When actions with such possible effect are not physically sensed, it is much harder to incorporate them into the awareness of the situation that an actor finds himself in, and upon which he or she bases his or her actions. While more and more networks are being developed that are increasingly vital for people’s survival, so violations become more and more likely to happen, people do not seem to worry about this. I would argue that this is also partly caused by a lack of physical clashes between intention and realization when presence is mediated.